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ABSTRACT 
Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger 
Control 
by Damien J. Neven and Lars-Hendrik Röller* 
This paper considers merger control in a common agency framework where firms and 
their competitors can influence the antitrust agency and where transparency – while 
making lobbying less effective – also implies real resource costs. We examine the 
performance of two alternative standards that can be assigned to the antitrust agency in 
the presence of these regulatory failures. We find that under a welfare standard, 
lobbying leads to the clearance of relatively inefficient mergers that decrease welfare  
(i. e. there is a type II error). By contrast, under a consumer surplus standard, the agency 
will ban relatively efficient mergers that would increase welfare (i. e. there is a type I 
error). Lobbying actually reduces the extent to which this occurs, albeit at a cost in 
terms of real resources. We also find that a consumer surplus standard is more attractive 
when mergers are large, when increasing the size of a merger greatly enhances industry 
profits, when there is little transparency, and when co-ordination costs amongst 
competitors are low. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG   
Konsumentenrente vs. Wohlfahrtskriterium in einem polit-ökonomischen Modell 
der Fusionskontrolle 
In diesem Beitrag wird die wettbewerbsrechtliche Analyse der Fusionskontrolle mit 
einem Agency-Ansatz erweitert, in dem Unternehmen die Kartellbehörde beeinflussen 
können und wo Lobbying Kosten verursacht. Es werden zwei unterschiedliche 
Entscheidungskriterien der Fusionsbehörde hinsichtlich ihrer Effizienz untersucht. 
Benutzt die Fusionsbehörde ein Wohlfahrtskriterium führt Lobbying seitens der 
Unternehmen zur Genehmigung von ineffiziente Fusionen, was zu einem Sinken der 
Wohlfahrt führt. Andererseits führt das Kriterium der Konsumentenrente zur 
Untersagung von verhältnismäßig effiziente Fusionen, was die Wohlfahrt ebenfalls 
reduziert. Daraus ergibt sich, daß eine Berücksichtigung der Anreizstrukturen der 
Unternehmen die Wettbewerbsbehörde zu beeinflussen, wohlfahrttheoretisch keine 
eindeutige Betrachtungsweise zuläßt. In diesem Sinne zeigt sich, daß das Kriterium der 
Konsumentenrente vorteilhafter ist, bei Mega-Fusionen, wenn Fusionen sehr profitable 
sind, wenn es wenig Transparenz gibt und wenn die Koordinationskosten zwischen den 
nicht-fusionierenden Unternehmen niedrig sind.  
                                                 
*  We would like to thank seminar participants at the Graduate Institute of International Studies 
(Geneva) and the 27th EARIE meeting in Lausanne for comments on a previous version of this paper. 
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate alternative objectives that can be assigned to
an antitrust agency in charge of merger control. It is striking that some of the major
antitrust agencies actually operate with objectives that diﬀer from welfare maximisa-
tion. For instance, Art. 2 of the merger regulation stipulates that the merger task force
should be solely concerned about restrictions of competition and that eﬃciency beneÞts
should only be taken into account in so far as consumers are not hurt. Hence, it would
appear that the merger regulation is concerned about consumer surplus and not aggre-
gate welfare. The US antitrust legislation has a similar bias in favour of consumers (see
e.g. Gellhorn and Kovacic, 1994).
In a world with no regulatory failures, excluding Þrms proÞts from the objectives
assigned to the antitrust authority would seem hard to justify on eﬃciency grounds.
However, in the presence of regulatory failures a systematic bias in favour of a particular
interest may occur. In this context, it may be desirable for the public authority (the
ultimate principal) to manipulate the objective function of the antitrust agency so as
to compensate for the bias ex ante. For instance, an explicit emphasis on consumer
surplus, possibly a full truncation of the objective of the antitrust agency so that proÞts
are ignored, may be appropriate. That is, decisions taken according to a consumer
surplus standard may actually lead to higher welfare than those taken according to a
welfare standard.
This paper considers the regulatory failures associated with the inßuences that can
be brought to bear on an antitrust agency in charge of merger control1. We consider
a common agency framework (à la Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) in which interested
parties can provide inducements to the antitrust agency which are contingent on the
outcome of the merger review. We characterise the contingent perks that Þrms will
provide and the decisions that will be taken by the antitrust agency for a distribution of
possible mergers and for alternative objectives that can be assigned to the agency. We
then compare the advantages and drawbacks of alternative objectives.
In particular, we consider a model with four stages. In the Þrst stage, the government
decides on the objective that it will assign to the antitrust agency. We focus on two
alternative objectives, namely welfare and consumer surplus2.
1Besanko and Spulber (1993) consider a model where regulatory failures arise from asymmetric
information regarding the characteristics of the merger, known by the merging Þrms but not the antitrust
agency. They also evaluate alternative objective functions that the government might assign to the
antitrust agency. They Þnd that the optimal rule should give more weight to consumer surplus than
proÞts.
2We focus on these polar cases (rather than consider a continuum of objective functions characterised
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In the second stage, a merger is notiÞed and the interested parties provide contin-
gent bids. We consider three interested parties, namely consumers, the merging Þrms
and their competitors. However, we assume that consumers are unable to lobby the
antitrust agency. This may arise for at least two reasons. First, consumers may not
be well informed about the consequences of proposed mergers and accordingly may not
be able to formulate appropriate contingent bids. Second, consumers may face pro-
hibitive transaction costs in representing their interests. These costs could be associated
with the traditional problems of free-riding and collective action with numerous agents.
The assumption that consumers are underrepresented in merger review also seems to
be broadly consistent with casual observation (for instance, consumer organisations are
seldom represented in merger hearings).
In the third stage, the antitrust agency (the common agent) decides whether or not
to allow the proposed mergers on the basis of its assigned objective and the contingent
perks by the interested parties (the principals). In line with the literature on political
economy interactions in a common agency framework (see for instance Grossman and
Helpman, 1994), we do not explicitly model how the actions of the antitrust agency
could be monitored by the government. Rather, we simply assume that the agency
is subject to imperfect accountability and can compromise the pursuit of its mission
while responding to perks. Unlike the previous literature, we explicitly consider the
eﬀect of accountability. In particular, when the agency is accountable, only a fraction
of what Þrms spend in lobbying will aﬀect the agencys behaviour, so that with greater
accountability the agency will be more diﬃcult to inßuence. Moreover, we assume that
the share of Þrms bid which does not aﬀect the agencys behaviour is pure social waste.
This assumption is is meant to represent the fact that with greater transparency inßuence
has to take indirect routes which are typically less eﬃcient than a direct transfer. For
instance, when bribes can be monitored by the government, inßuences will take place
through indirect means like expensive lunches or the promise of lucrative jobs in the
private sectors (the revolving door). Whereas pure transfers do not entail any eﬃciency
losses, indirect means of inßuencing the agency typically involve some real resource cost.
Hence, while greater transparency polices the behaviour of the agency, it also involves
some real resource costs. We also assume that lobbying by competitors is relatively less
eﬃcient than lobbying by merging Þrms simply because competitors are more numerous
and hence incur some co-ordination cost. As a result we allow for co-ordination costs
amongst competitors that are increasing in the number of competing Þrms.
In the Þnal stage, product market competition takes place. In equilibrium, Þrms
will thus provide perks anticipating the decision taken by the antitrust agency and the
by diﬀerent weights for proÞts) because intermediate cases are presumably hard to implement in practice.
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proÞts that will accrue from the outcome of this decision.
The proÞts that merging Þrms and their competitors anticipate as a result of any
particular merger conÞguration are determined by market interactions before and after
the merger. For our purposes, we do not need to specify the market game explicitly,
but rather make some general monotonicity assumptions on the reduced form proÞt
function of the merging Þrms and their competitors, as well as consumer surplus. In
particular, we assume that the proÞts of the merging Þrms, the consumer surplus and
welfare increase monotonically with the eﬃciency gains achieved by the merger, while
the proÞts of competitors decrease monotonically. These assumptions are reasonable
and hold for Cournot with homogenous products. We also assume that larger mergers
always enhance industry proÞts but reduce welfare.
For both of the agencys objective functions (i.e. welfare and consumer surplus), we
characterise the equilibrium and the associated welfare (ex post) for a range of possible
mergers characterised by diﬀerent eﬃciency levels. We Þnd that under a welfare standard
the agency will allow relatively ineﬃcient mergers that decreases welfare (there is a
type II error). In those circumstances, there is also some social waste associated with
lobbying by the merging Þrms and their competitors. By contrast, when the agency
operates with a consumer surplus standard, it will ban relatively eﬃcient mergers that
would increase welfare (there is a type I error). In addition, there is range of mergers
which display even higher eﬃciency which are only allowed because of lobbying. In
those circumstances, there is some social waste associated with lobbying but no decision
error. Overall, lobbying still appears to be desirable under a consumer surplus standard
because lobbying re-balances the objective function of the antitrust agency in favour of
Þrms. Looking at the relative costs and beneÞts of the alternative standards, we observe
that a consumer surplus standard is more attractive when mergers are large, when
increasing the size of a merger greatly enhances industry proÞts, and when transparency
and co-ordination costs are low.
We present the model in Section 2 and derive the equilibrium in Section 3. The
comparative statics with respect to the size of the merger and transparency is presented
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider an industry with N Þrms. A merger in this industry is characterised by the
number of Þrms involved, M, and by the level of eﬃciency, e, which is achieved by the
merged entity. This parameter can be thought of as the reduction of the marginal cost
accruing to the merging Þrms.
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The structure of the game is illustrated in Figure 1. In stage 1 the government
assigns a standard to the antitrust agency. It can choose either a welfare standard or a
consumer surplus standard. The objective function of the government is the change in
total welfare (proÞts and consumer surplus) less the waste associated with the lobbying
process:
W = Πm +Πc + CS − (1− α)Fm − (1− α+ ε(N −M))Fc (1)
where Πm is the change in aggregate proÞts accruing to the merging Þrms, Πc is the
change in aggregate proÞts to the competing Þrms, CS is the change in consumer surplus,
Fm and Fc are the combined bids of the merging parties and the competing Þrms to
the agency, respectively. Note that if the merger is banned, the change in proÞts and
consumer surplus is simply zero.
We assume that the process of lobbying involves two types of ineﬃciencies. First, a
fraction (1 − α) of the bids paid by the merging Þrms and its competitors are wasted.
As discussed above, a high share of waste corresponds to an environment with high
transparency so that Þrms have to resort to indirect and ineﬃcient means of inßuencing
the government. Second, we also assume that lobbying by competitors is relatively less
eﬃcient than lobbying by merging Þrms simply because competitors are more numerous
and hence incur some co-ordination cost. The waste associated with co-ordination is
captured by the term ε(N − M), where we assume that the co-ordination costs are
increasing in the number of competing Þrms3 N −M , i.e. ε0(N −M) > 0. Let us also
denote β = α− ε(N −M) as the share of the bid paid by the competitors which is pure
waste.
In stage 2, Þrms provide contingent bids to the agency. The objective function of the
Þrms are the changes in their net proÞt, namely the change in their proÞt (as deÞned
above) minus the bids that they provide to the agency.
In stage 3, the agency decides whether to allow the merger or not. The agency takes
into account the standard set by the government and the bids by Þrms. Whenever the
agency has been given a welfare standard by the government, its objective functions is
given by,
U1 = Πm +Πc + CS + αFm + (α− ε(N −M))Fc (2)
3Note that in this speciÞcation the merging Þrms do not incur any co-ordination costs
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In other words, the agency maximises the sum of the change in welfare associated with
the merger and the eﬀective bids (the share of the bid which is not wasted). As discussed
above, we assume that consumers cannot lobby.
Alternatively, whenever the agency is endowed with a consumer surplus standard,
its objective function is given by,
U2 = CS + αFm + (α− ε(N −M))Fc (3)
In stage 4, Þrms compete and proÞts and bids are realised.
3 The equilibrium
We look for a perfect equilibrium and solve the model by backward induction. Hence,
we Þrst consider the equilibrium in stage 4 where Þrms compete.
3.1 Product market competition in stage 4.
Let Π∗m denote the change in aggregate gross equilibrium proÞts of the merging Þrms
and Π∗c denote the change in aggregate gross equilibrium proÞts of the competitors (that
is the proÞts before bids are deducted), if the merger is realised. If the merger is not
allowed, gross proÞts are unaﬀected so that the changes in gross proÞts are zero.
We do not explicitly specify the market game but assume that the following properties
of the proÞt functions as well as consumer surplus hold in equilibrium4:
A1: ∂Π
∗
m
∂e
> 0, ∂Π
∗
c
∂e
< 0, ∂(Π
∗
m+Π
∗
c)
∂e
> 0
A2: ∂CS
∂e
> 0
A3: ∂(Π
∗
m+Π
∗
c+CS
∗)
∂M
< 0
A2: ∂(Π
∗
m+Π
∗
c)
∂M
> 0
Hence, we assume that the proÞtability of a merger increases with the level of eﬃ-
ciency that it can achieve. The proÞts of competitors fall with this level of eﬃciency
but the industry proÞt still rises. We also assume that as the eﬃciency gains increase,
the equilibrium price falls so that the consumer surplus increases. These assumptions
imply that welfare increases in line with the eﬃciency gain. It is straightforward but te-
dious to check that these properties actually hold for a Cournot model with homogenous
products.
4We also assume that they are continuous and diﬀerentiable.
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The last two assumptions restrict our analysis to situations where larger mergers
increase industry proÞts and reduce welfare. These assumptions accord with intuition
and should hold for a wide variety of market models.
Beyond our maintained assumptions about the proÞt function A1-A4, we further
assume that the competitors (whose proÞt fall with eﬃciency) and the consumers (whose
surplus increase with eﬃciency) are indiﬀerent for an identical value of the eﬃciency gain
denoted by e0. In other words, ∃e0 > 0, s.t. Π∗c(e0) = CS∗(e0) = 0. This property does not
appear to be unduly restrictive since it accords with intuition that when the equilibrium
price is unaﬀected by the merger, competitors should also be unaﬀected. Again, one can
check that this property actually holds for a Cournot model with homogenous products
(see Bond, 1994). Finally, we assume the merging parties are rational and restrict
attention to the range of eﬃciency parameters which ensure that mergers are proÞtable
(i.e. such that Π∗m > 0).
The impact that a merger has on the interests of merging Þrms, competitors and
consumers under these assumptions is presented graphically in Figure 2, as a function
of the eﬃciency achieved by the merger (holding constant the number of Þrms as well as
the number of merging Þrms). Note that consumers and the competing Þrms never have
congruent interests. When eﬃciency is such that the price increases after the merger,
the interests of the merging Þrms and their competitors are aligned. By contrast, when
eﬃciency is large enough to guarantee that the price falls, the merging Þrms beneÞt from
the mergers and become the allies of consumers, against the interest of competitors.
For further reference, it is also useful to deÞne the eﬃciency level which guarantees
that the change in total welfare is unaﬀected by the merger. Denote the change in
welfare at a given eﬃciency gain by
∼
S∗(e) = Π∗c(e) + Π
∗
m(e) + CS
∗(e). Note that by
A1 and A2
∼
S(e) is increasing in e. DeÞne the eﬃciency level at which total welfare is
unchanged by the merger as
∼
e such that
∼
S∗(
∼
e) = 0 (see also Figure 2).
Note that the change in welfare at e is positive, since Π∗c(e
0) = CS∗(e0) = 0 and
Π∗m(e
0) > 0. The last inequality holds, since at an eﬃciency level of e0, price and output
are unaﬀected by the merger. Total revenues are thus unaﬀected but total costs fall in
line with the eﬃciency gain so that the change in proÞts has to be positive. Furthermore,
given the monotonicity of welfare (through A1 and A2) , we also have that
∼
e < e0.
Our assumptions with respect to the size of the merger (A3 and A4) can also be
illustrated in Figure 2. A4 implies that the sum of Þrms proÞts is shifted upwards for
larger mergers. By A3, consumer surplus is shifted downwards and the eﬃciency level
for which welfare is unaﬀected (
∼
e) moves to the right.
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3.2 Decisions by the antitrust authority in stage 3
In stage 3 the agency decides on the merger. The decision of the authority is either to
ban (D = 0) or to allow (D = 1) the merger (no remedies are allowed). In order to avoid
unessential complexities, we assume that if the agency is indiﬀerent between allowing
and prohibiting a merger, it will decide to allow it. The equilibrium at this stage is
straightforward: the agency simply compares the levels of utility that it achieves under
each outcome and selects the outcome that yields the highest level.
Formally, the equilibrium is described as follows. Consider Þrst the welfare standard.
In this case, the agencies utility if they allow the merger is given by (2), i.e. U1(D = 1) =
Π∗m+Π
∗
c +CS
∗+ αFm(D = 1) + (α− ε(N −M))Fc(D = 1). Similarly, the utility if the
agency blocks the merger is given by U1(D = 0) = αFm(D = 0)+(α−ε(N−M))Fc(D =
0). For the consumer surplus standard, the agencies utility if they allow the merger is
given by (3), i.e. U2(D = 1) = CS∗ + αFm(D = 1) + (α − ε(N − M))Fc(D = 1),
while the utility if the agency blocks the merger is given by U2(D = 0) = αFm(D =
0) + (α − ε(N −M))Fc(D = 0). Therefore, the decision by the agency is characterized
by,
D = { 1 if Ui(D = 1) ≥ Ui(D = 0)
0 otherwise
}
where i = 1, 2 indicates the welfare and consumer standard respectively.
3.3 Lobbying decisions at Stage 2
We derive equilibrium bids for both welfare and consumer surplus standards. Note that
the bids are contingent on the actions of the antitrust agency. We therefore need to
consider Þrms incentives to bid against and in favor of the merger being allowed. We
begin with the welfare standard.
3.3.1 Welfare standard
Assume that the agency is assigned the welfare standard. In order to solve for the
equilibrium bids, it is convenient to distinguish among various parameter regions with
respect to the eﬃciency level. As noted above, when e < e0, both the merging Þrms
and their competitors beneÞt from the merger and hence will never bid to inßuence the
antitrust authority against the merger. We therefore have Fm(D = 0) = Fc(D = 0) = 0.
We Þrst consider the Þrms incentives to bid in favor of the merger for regions e ≤ e0.
Consider the region where
∼
e ≤ e ≤ e0. This is the range of eﬃciency for which mergers
do not increase the consumer surplus but do not reduce welfare.
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Lemma 1 Let
∼
e ≤ e ≤ e0. Firms will not bid and the merger is allowed.
Proof: The agency will allow the merger without any bids, since U1(D = 1) =
Π∗m +Π
∗
c + CS
∗ ≥ U1(D = 0) = 0. Therefore in equilibrium Þrms will not bid. Q.E.D.
In this region, the eﬃciency of the merger is such that welfare does not fall. Hence,
Þrms do not have to bid in order to inßuence the antitrust agency, which allows the
merger without any inducement.
Let us now focus on eﬃciency level below
∼
e. In this region, the change in welfare is
negative and Þrms (which beneÞt from the merger) will have to provide incentive to the
agency if they want the merger to be allowed. Given the decision of the agency in stage
3, Þrms will have to ensure that U1(D = 1) ≥ 0. Consider the highest amount that Þrms
can bid, i.e. their entire proÞt. The resulting value of the utility of the agency if the
merger is allowed is then given by S∗1(e) = Π
∗
m+Π
∗
c +CS
∗+αΠ∗m+ (α− ε(N −M))Π∗c .
Let e∗1 be the eﬃciency level such that such that S
∗
1(e
∗
1) = 0.
Lemma 2 For e < e∗1, Þrms will not bid and the merger is blocked. For e
∗
1 ≤ e <
∼
e,
Þrms bid such that U1(D = 1) = 0 and the merger is allowed.
Proof : Note that S∗1(e) is monotonically increasing and continuous in e by A1 and
A2. Since S∗1(
∼
e) > 0, we have that e∗1 <
∼
e and that e∗1 is unique and it exists (assuming
that S∗1(e) < 0 for some possibly negative e). Let e < e
∗
1 such that S
∗
1(e) < 0, which
implies that U1(D = 1) < 0 for the maximum bids. Therefore, the merger is blocked
and it is optimal for Þrms not to bid. Let e∗1 < e <
∼
e, which implies that S∗1(e) > 0.
Any pair of bids Fm(D = 1), Fc(D = 1) such that U1(D = 1) = 0 is an equilibrium. The
merger is allowed. Q.E.D.
Hence, whenever eﬃciency is insuﬃcient to guarantee that the merger will increase
welfare, Þrms have to provide incentives to the agency in order to have the merger
waved through. However, the proÞt of the merging Þrms and its competitors increase
in line with the level of eﬃciency. There is thus a range of eﬃciency parameter (below
that which guarantees no change in welfare) for which Þrms have suﬃcient proÞt to
provide adequate incentives to the antitrust agency. In this region, we consequently
have two types of ineﬃciencies, which occur simultaneously. The Þrst one arises because
the merger is pushed through by the lobbying activity of Þrms, even though it reduces
welfare. We therefore have a type II error. In addition, there is bidding in equilibrium
and this entails some waste.
It is worth noting at this point that the agency does not obtain any rent from the
political economy interactions because Þrms always provide just enough incentives to
make the antitrust agency indiﬀerent between allowing and prohibiting the merger. It is
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indeed a standard feature of equilibrium in common agency games that the agent obtains
positive rents from the interactions only if the principals have divergent interests (see
for instance Grossman and Helpman, 1994).
We now consider the region where the incentives of the Þrms are not aligned, i.e.
when e is above e0.
Lemma 3 For e > e0, the merger is allowed. In equilibrium the merging Þrms bid
Fm(D = 1) = max{0,−βΠ∗c − (Π∗m +Π∗c + CS∗)}.
Proof : Given that competitors are hurt by the merger we must have that Fc(D =
1) = 0, which implies that the agency will allow the merger when U1(D = 1) = Π∗m +
Π∗c + CS
∗ + αFm(D = 1) ≥ U1(D = 0) = βFc(D = 0). Note that by A1, we have that
Π∗m > −Π∗c, which implies that in equilibrium Fm(D = 1) < Π∗m, i.e. the merging Þrms
are always able to push the merger through. Assume that Π∗m +Π
∗
c + CS
∗ < −βΠ∗c so
that competitors could have the merger prohibited in the absence of bid by the merging
Þrms. Fm(D = 1) = −βΠ∗c−(Π∗m+Π∗c+CS∗) is then a best reply to Fc(D = 0) = −βΠ∗c
. Fc(D = 0) = −βΠ∗c is a (weak) best reply to Fm(D = 1) = −βΠ∗c − (Π∗m+Π∗c +CS∗).
In equilibrium, the maximum bid of the competing Þrms is neutralized by the merging
Þrms. Next, assume that Π∗m + Π
∗
c + CS
∗ > −βΠ∗c . Then Fm(D = 1) = 0 is an
equilibrium since the maximum bid of the competing Þrms can not block the merger.
Furthermore, any contingent bid by competitors Fc(D = 0) is a best reply. Q.E.D.
In this region, the level of eﬃciency is such that competitors are harmed by the
merger and would want to inßuence the antitrust agency to block it. We therefore have
opposing interests on the part of the Þrms. In principle, the competitors might lose more
from the mergers than what the merger entails in terms of welfare gains, i.e. is possible
that Π∗m + Π
∗
c + CS
∗ < −βΠ∗c . In this case, where competitors are badly hurt by a
merger, they are capable to compensate the agency for the loss of welfare that would
arise if the merger is prohibited. However, as the above lemma shows, the merging Þrms
are always able to neutralize the bids by the competitors, which implies that the merger
will always go through. The agency does not make an error but there is a social cost
associated with lobbying. When the maximum bid of the competitors could not overturn
the merger even if the merging Þrms do not bid (Π∗m+Π
∗
c +CS
∗ < −βΠ∗c), the merging
Þrms do not bid and there is no waste.
In sum, we Þnd that relative to the adjacent parameter range (i.e. to the left of e0),
the emergence of opposing interests among Þrms does not change the outcome of the
merger decision, but may introduce lobbying activity, and hence some an ineﬃciency.
When there is no interest which dominates, the merging Þrms, which can always trump
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the competitors, has to lobby. In this case, the agency obtains some rent from the
political economy interaction.
We now turn to the alternative standard.
3.3.2 Consumer surplus standard
Assume that the agency is assigned the consumer surplus standard. As before, we Þrst
focus on the parameter region for which Þrms incentives are aligned (e ≤ e0), such that
Fm(D = 0) = Fc(D = 0) = 0. We Þrst consider the region such that e ≤ ∼e, i.e. where
eﬃciency is not suﬃcient to guarantee that the change in welfare is positive.
Lemma 4 Let e ≤ ∼e. Firms will not bid and the merger is blocked.
Proof: The agency will allow the merger iﬀ U2(D = 1) = CS∗+ αFm(D = 1) + (α−
ε(N −M))Fc(D = 1) ≥ 0. This can not hold since Π∗c(e) + Π∗m(e) + CS∗(e) ≤ 0 for
e ≤ ∼e. The merger is blocked and it is optimal for Þrms not to bid. Q.E.D.
In this region, both the change in consumer surplus and welfare are non-positive.
Hence, Þrms do not have suﬃcient resources to compensate the antitrust agency for the
loss of consumers surplus that a merger would entail. As a result, Þrms do not bid and
the merger is prohibited.
Let us now focus on eﬃciency level above
∼
e, such that
∼
e < e < e0. In this region, the
change in consumers surplus is still negative and Þrms might be able to provide enough
incentive to the agency in order to get the merger approved. Given the decision of the
agency in stage 3, Þrms will have to ensure that U2(D = 1) ≥ 0. Consider the highest
amount that Þrms can bid, i.e. their entire proÞt. The resulting value of the utility of the
agency if the merger is allowed is then given by S∗2(e) = CS
∗+αΠ∗m+(α−ε(N−M))Π∗c .
Let e∗2 be the eﬃciency level such that S
∗
2(e
∗
2) = 0. Note that S
∗
2(e) is continuous and
monotonically increasing in e by A1 and A2. Since S∗2(
∼
e) < 0 and S∗2(e
0) > 0 it follows
that
∼
e < e∗2 < e
0 and that it is unique.
Lemma 5 For
∼
e < e < e∗2 Þrms do not bid and the merger is blocked. For e
∗
2 ≤ e < e0
Þrms bid such that U2(D = 1) = 0 and the merger is allowed.
Proof : Let
∼
e < e < e∗2. In this case, S
∗
2(e) < 0, which implies that the merger is
blocked even if Þrms bid their entire proÞts. Hence, Þrms will not bid and the merger
is blocked. Let e∗2 ≤ e < e0, which implies that S∗2(e) ≥ 0 . Any pair of bids such
that Fm(D = 1), Fc(D = 1) such that U2(D = 1) = 0 is an equilibrium. The merger is
allowed. Q.E.D.
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As eﬃciency increases beyond the level at which welfare is unchanged, proÞts increase
and the harm to consumers falls. There is a region (
∼
e < e < e∗2) for which the proÞts are
still insuﬃcient to provide adequate incentives to the antitrust agency and the merger is
prohibited even though it would increase welfare. In this region, there is a type I error
but no social waste associated with lobbying. Beyond this level of eﬃciency (e∗2 ≤ e < e0),
the merger is allowed but only because Þrms provide adequate inducement, which involve
some social waste. As the eﬃciency level approaches the level for which consumer surplus
is unaﬀected, the bids and hence the social waste converge to zero.
We now consider the region where the Þrms incentives are not aligned, i.e. such that
e is above e0.
Lemma 6 For e ≥ e0, the merger is allowed. The merging Þrms bid Fm(D = 1) =
max{0,−βΠ∗c − CS∗}
Proof : See proof of Lemma 3, which applies mutatis mutandis.
In this region, the level of eﬃciency is such that competitors are harmed by the
merger and would want to inßuence the antitrust agency to block the merger. In the
case where competitors are badly hurt by a merger (CS∗ < −βΠ∗c), they are capable
to compensate the agency for the loss in consumer surplus that would arise if the merger
is prohibited. In this case, the merging Þrms, which can always trump the competitors,
need to compensate for the maximum bid that competitors can lodge. The agency
make no error in its decision but lobbying leads to social waste and some rent for the
antitrust agency. When the maximum bid of competitors cannot compensate for the
change in consumer surplus, the merging Þrms do not need to bid and there is no waste
In sum, we Þnd (as in the case of the welfare standard) that the merger is allowed
despite opposing interest. Under the consumer surplus standard, the merger is pushed
through, to the left of e0, by a joint action of the mergers Þrms and their competitors
. To the right, the merger might be pushed through again by the action by the merging
Þrms which compensate for that of the competitors. When lobbying is taking place,
some ineﬃciency will also arise. Comparing the condition in Lemma 6 with Lemma
3, we Þnd that the condition for a wasteful equilibrium to exist is stricter for the
welfare standard. This implies that there exist parameter regions for which equilibrium
under the welfare standard does not involve any bidding, while the equilibrium under the
consumer surplus standard does involve bidding (and therefore waste). The reverse is
not true. In addition, the bid of the merging Þrms under the consumer surplus standard
(Fm(D = 1) = −βΠ∗c − CS∗) is always higher than the bid under the welfare standard
(Fm(D = 1) = −βΠc − (Π∗m +Π∗c + CS∗)).
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3.3.3 The choice of standard in stage 1
At this stage, the government decides on the welfare standard in order to maximise (1).
DenoteW1 andW2 as the equilibrium level of the governments objective function under
the welfare standard and consumer surplus standard respectively. In order to provide
a benchmark, we also deÞne the maximum level of the governments objective function
that could be achieved for any e, i.e. the Þrst best denoted by
∧
W . Under the Þrst best,
the social planner would set waste to zero, which implies no bidding by the Þrms. For
e <
∼
e, the merger will be banned so that
∧
W = 0. For e ≥ ∼e, mergers will be allowed so
that
∧
W = Π∗m +Π
∗
c + CS
∗.
The next two lemmas characterize the governments objective function under the
welfare and consumer surplus standards. Given the results of Lemma 3 and 6, we will
assume that CS∗ > −βΠ∗c, which ensures that Þrms will not bid when e > e0 under
either standard.
Lemma 7 The governments objective function under the welfare standard is given by
W1 =
 0 if e < e∗1−(Fm + Fc) if e∗1 ≤ e < ∼e
Π∗m +Π
∗
c + CS
∗ if
∼
e ≤ e

Proof : The Þrst and third statements follow directly from respectively Lemma 2 and
Lemma 1. Consider the second statement; from Lemma 2, it follows that in equilibrium
Π∗m + Π
∗
c + CS
∗ = αFm(D = 1) + (α − ε(N −M))Fc(D = 1). Using this equality to
evaluate (1), the result follows directly. Q.E.D.
Lemma 8 The governments objective function under the consumer surplus standard is
given by W2 =
 0 if e < e∗2Π∗m +Π∗c − Fm − Fc if e∗2 ≤ e < e0
Π∗m +Π
∗
c + CS
∗ if e0 ≤ e

Proof : Follows directly from Lemmata 4 and 5, using (1). Q.E.D.
The previous results are further illustrated in Figure 3 which represents the diﬀerence
in the objective function of the government under the two rules, i.e. W1 −W2. When
eﬃciency gains are very small (i.e. e < e∗1), the merger is always banned, no bids are put
forward, the two standards are equivalent and yield the Þrst best (i.e.
∧
W = W1 = W2 =
0).
When e∗1 ≤ e <
∼
e, mergers are still prevented under the consumer surplus standard,
no bids are put forward and the Þrst best is achieved (
∧
W = W2 = 0). By contrast, under
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the welfare standard, Þrms bid and the merger is allowed. This introduces two types of
ineﬃciencies: (i) the merger is allowed even though it yields a negative welfare, so that
there is a type II error, and (ii) there is waste associated with the bids. The sum of
the two ineﬃciencies add up to the value of the bids (so that W1 −W2 = −(Fm + Fc)).
The reason is that the eﬀective value of the bid (the part which is not wasted) has to
compensate exactly for the loss of welfare in equilibrium. The ineﬃciency, which is the
loss of welfare and the wasted part of the bids, is thus equal to the bids. Furthermore,
the magnitude of the bids falls as the eﬃciency gains of the merger increase (see Figure
3). At e =
∼
e, Þrms do not need to bid any longer since the merger does not decrease
welfare.
When
∼
e ≤ e < e∗2, under the welfare standard Þrms do not bid and the merger is
allowed so that the Þrst best is achieved (W1 =
∧
W = Π∗m + Π
∗
c + CS
∗). Under the
consumer surplus standard, the merger is blocked but Þrms do not put forward any
bid. There is thus a type I error: a merger which increases welfare is blocked and
W1 −W2 = Π∗m +Π∗c + CS∗. Given that welfare increases in e, the opportunity cost of
not allowing the merger increases as the eﬃciency gain rises (see Figure 3).
When e∗2 ≤ e < e0, under the welfare standard, the Þrst best is achieved. Under the
consumer surplus standard, Þrms bid and the merger is allowed. There is no type I
error but there is waste associated with bidding, such that W1−W2 = (1−α)Fm+(1−
α + ε(N −M))Fc. Note that for e = e∗2, the entire proÞt is bid and the proportion of
the proÞt which is not wasted is equal to the loss in consumer surplus. Therefore, the
change in welfare at e∗2 is equal to zero. As a result W1 −W2 is continuous at e = e∗2.
Moreover, as eﬃciency gains increase, the waste in bidding falls (down to 0 at e0).
Overall, it appears that neither standard dominates over the entire range of param-
eters, even though one of the two standards is always Þrst best for any given eﬃciency
level. Consumer surplus and welfare standard give rise to diﬀerent types of costs de-
pending on the eﬃciency level. On the one hand, a number of relatively ineﬃcient
mergers  which decrease welfare  are pushed through under a welfare standard. On
the other hand, some relatively eﬃcient mergers (which would increase welfare) are pro-
hibited under the consumer surplus standard. This result accord with intuition; when
the agency is supposed to consider welfare but Þrms can inßuence the agency, one would
indeed expect the outcome to be biased in favour of Þrms and against consumers. With
a welfare standard, lobbying activity thus lowers welfare.5
5Note however that if all interests were equally represented and equally eﬃcient in their lobbying,
the welfare standard would not give rise to any error. It is a standard feature of common agency games
that when the agent has a welfare standard and the principals bid their marginal beneÞt, the agent
mimics the behaviour of an independent agent which would simply maximise welfare (see for instance
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By contrast, when the agency defends consumers interest, it will be biased against
the interest of Þrms and tend to prohibit mergers that enhance welfare. Firms lobbying
activity will tend to compensate for the narrow objective of the agency and thereby
reduce the range of relatively eﬃcient mergers that are prohibited. Without lobbying,
all mergers in between
∼
e and e0 would be prohibited with a loss in welfare equal to
Π∗m+Π
∗
c+CS
∗. With lobbying, the welfare loss is strictly smaller for the region between
e∗2 and e
0 (see Figure 3). Under the consumer surplus standard, lobbying thus strictly
improves welfare.
A comparison between the two standards over the entire range of parameters can
also be undertaken. However, such a comparison requires an explicit assumption about
the distribution of mergers that the agency will face in terms of their eﬃciency level.
This distribution is also likely to have a strong inßuence on the eventual outcome of
the comparison. For instance, it is likely that if the expected population of mergers is
biased in favour of very eﬃcient mergers, the consumer surplus standard will dominate.
At the opposite, if the distribution of expected mergers features a high density of rather
ineﬃcient mergers, it is likely that a consumer surplus standard will be preferred. In
addition, an explicit comparison of the two standards would require a speciÞc assumption
about the distribution of lobbying eﬀorts between merging Þrms and their competitors
(given that action by the latter is less eﬃcient than action by the former). Again, this
assumption might matter a great deal for the outcome of the comparison and would
be some somewhat arbitrary. Hence, rather than make explicit assumptions about
the distribution of expected mergers and the allocation of lobbying eﬀort and derive
an explicit comparison between the two standard, we focus on comparative statics. In
particular, we next examine how the comparison between the two standards would be
aﬀected by a change in the eﬃciency of the lobbying process and a change in the size of
the mergers.
Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Hence, if consumers had equally eﬃcient access to the antitrust agency,
all welfare enhancing mergers would be allowed in our model and all welfare decreasing mergers would
be prohibited. However, the Þrst best would still not be obtained as a potentially large amount of waste
would occur because of lobbying. In addition, if the merging Þrms, the competitors and consumers
were not equally eﬃcient in lobbying or if lobbying entailed some Þxed cost, the equilibrium under the
welfare standard would entail some errors.
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4 The trade-oﬀ between welfare and consumer sur-
plus standards
Let us Þrst characterise the trade-oﬀ between the two standards with respect to the eﬃ-
ciency of the lobbying process. As discussed above, more transparency in the operation
of the anti-trust agency will tend to increase the amount of resources which is wasted
in lobbying. In the context of our model, a more eﬃcient process of lobbying is thus
associated with less transparency. An increase in α or a decrease in ε are associated
with a more eﬃcient process of lobbying.
We Þrst characterise (Proposition 1) how the various parameter regions are aﬀected
by a change in α and ε. A full comparison between the two standards, however, needs
to consider how the absolute levels of the governments objective function is aﬀected.
This will be undertaken in the subsequent proposition.
Proposition 1 With a more eﬃcient lobbying process, the eﬃciency region over which
the consumer surplus standard (CSS) is dominated is unchanged and the eﬃciency region
over which the CSS dominates increases.
Proof : By deÞnition of
∼
e and e0 and by A1 and the monotonicity of S∗1(.) and S
∗
2(.),
we have that ∂e
∗
1
∂α
< 0,
∂e∗2
∂α
< 0, ∂
∼
e
∂α
= ∂e
0
∂α
= 0 and ∂e
∗
1
∂ε
> 0,
∂e∗2
∂ε
> 0, ∂
∼
e
∂ε
= ∂e
0
∂ε
= 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 illustrates that a more eﬃcient lobbying process increases the set of
parameters for which mergers that decrease welfare are pushed through under a welfare
standard (i.e. in between e∗1 and
∼
e). This accords with intuition; as a higher share of
proÞt can be used to eﬀectively inßuence the agency, mergers which require marginally
more inßuence over the agency can now be pushed through.
By contrast, the eﬃciency of the lobbying process does not aﬀect the range of pa-
rameters for which ineﬃcient outcomes occur under a consumer surplus standard, since
neither
∼
e nor e0 are eﬀected by the eﬃciency of the lobbying process. The reason for this
is that the ineﬃcient outcomes near
∼
e cannot be pushed through by Þrms. A marginal
increase in eﬃciency does not change this. Also, in the upper limit of the ineﬃciency
region (near e0) only a marginal amount of resources is necessary to push the merger
through at this point and more eﬃcient lobbying does not aﬀect the outcome.
Hence, it appears that in terms of parameters ranges, the consumer surplus standard
becomes more attractive than the welfare standard as the eﬃciency of lobbying increases.
The next proposition examines how the value of the governments objective function
is aﬀected by more eﬃcient lobbying.
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Proposition 2 In the eﬃciency region where the CSS is dominated, the net cost of the
CSS is reduced for more eﬃcient lobbying process. When the CSS dominates, the eﬀect
of a more eﬃcient lobbying process on the net beneÞt of the CSS is ambiguous.
Proof: Let us Þrst consider the region e∗2 ≤ e < e0 . The net cost of the CSS using
the above Lemmata 7 and 8 is W1 −W2 = (1− α)Fm + (1 − α + ε(N −M))Fc. From
the equilibrium conditions in stage 2 (Lemma 5) for any e, αFm + (α − ε(N −M))Fc
does not change with α (or ε ). Hence, when α increases (or ε falls), Fm + Fc falls.
Since (1 − α) and Fm + Fc fall in α (increase in ε ), it follows that W1 −W2 falls in α
(increases in ε ). Consider now the region
∼
e ≤ e < e∗2. In this region (see Lemmata 7
and 8) we have W1 −W2 = Πm + Πc + CS, which is independent of α (or ε ). Since,
∂e∗2/∂α < 0 and ∂e
∗
2/∂ε > 0 by Proposition 1, the Þrst part of the proposition follows.
For the second part of the proposition consider the region e∗1 ≤ e <
∼
e. We focus on the
comparative statics of α . The proof for ε is analogous. By Proposition 1 ∂e∗1/∂α < 0,
so that we Þrst consider e∗1 + ∂e
∗
1/∂α < e <
∼
e. In this region from Lemmata 7 and 8
we have W1 −W2 = −Fm− Fc, which is increasing in α by the equilibrium condition in
Lemma 2. Since, ∂e∗1/∂α < 0, there is a new region where the CSS is dominated, i.e.
W1 −W2 < 0. Q.E.D.
The Proposition is illustrated in Figure 4 and oﬀers two useful insights. The Þrst
insight relates to the parameter range for which the consumer surplus standard yields an
ineﬃcient outcome. As discussed, this parameter range is not aﬀected by the eﬃciency
of lobbying. However, Proposition 2 illustrates that the type of ineﬃciency that occurs
in this range is aﬀected by the eﬃciency of lobbying: as lobbying becomes more eﬃcient,
the range of parameter for which a type I errors occurs shrinks and the range of parameter
for which lobbying occurs, and implies some waste, will increase (see Figure 4). In other
words, as lobbying becomes more eﬃcient, more resources are available at the margin
to inßuence the antitrust agency and mergers which require marginally more inßuence
can eﬀectively be pushed through. As a result the range of parameters for which a type
I error occurs shrinks, and more mergers are pushed through.
In addition, a type I error always entails a higher eﬃciency loss than lobbying in
this parameter range (see Figure 4 again). The waste associated with lobbying is only
a fraction of the loss entailed by prohibiting the merger which is the entire opportunity
cost of the merger in terms of welfare. Hence, a reduction of type I errors will reduce
the cost associated with the consumer surplus standard in this area.
Consequently, there are two reasons as to why the cost associated with the consumer
surplus standard falls when lobbying becomes more eﬃcient. First, more eﬃcient lob-
bying implies that fewer resources are wasted for any eﬃciency level for which lobbying
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occurs. Second, more eﬃcient lobbying also reduces the range of parameters for which a
type I error occurs and this reduces the cost of the consumer surplus standard because
for any eﬃciency level, a type I error is more costly than the waste associated with
successful lobbying. This result which will be useful for further reference is collected in
Lemma 9.
Lemma 9 In the eﬃciency region where the CSS is dominated, the net cost of the CSS
increases in e∗2, holding
∼
e and e0 constant.
Proof: Follows from Proposition 2.
The second insight oﬀered by Proposition 2 relates to the parameter region where
mergers that decrease welfare are pushed through by lobbying under the welfare stan-
dard. As discussed above, more eﬃcient lobbying (less transparency) extends the range
of mergers for which a type II error occurs under the welfare standard. At the same
time, for any value of the eﬃciency parameter for which the merger is pushed through,
less resources are wasted in inßuencing the government (see Figure 4). As a result the
impact of more eﬃcient lobbying is ambiguous. This trade-oﬀ also illustrates the eﬀect
of transparency. On the one hand, transparency is desirable because it will reduce the
scope of undesirable deals that Þrms can manage to push through. On the other hand,
transparency is undesirable because it imposes a constraint on Þrms that they can only
circumvent at great cost.
We next characterise the trade-oﬀ with respect to market structure.
Proposition 3 The larger the size of the merger, the larger the eﬃciency region over
which the CSS dominates, and the larger the eﬃciency region over which the CSS is
dominated. Moreover, when the CSS is dominated, the eﬃciency regions for which Type
I errors occur shrinks relative to the eﬃciency region for which waste occurs.
Proof: We Þrst consider the region where the CSS dominates. Note that A3 can be
written as ∂
∼
S∗/∂M < 0. The deÞnition of
∼
e then implies that ∂
∼
e/∂M > 0 , i.e.
∼
e moves
to the right (see also Figure 5). If ∂S∗1/∂M > 0 (i.e. when merger size has a strong
eﬀect on industry proÞts), then ∂e∗1/∂M < 0, which implies that the region is getting
larger. If ∂S1/∂M < 0, then ∂e∗1/∂M > 0, i.e. e
∗
1 moves to the right. By A3 and A4 and
since ε0(N −M) > 0, we have ∂S∗1/∂M > ∂
∼
S∗/∂M . Since ∂S∗1/∂e > ∂
∼
S∗/∂e it follows
that ∂
∼
e/∂M > ∂e∗1/∂M , i.e. the function that has e
∗
1 as a Þxed point shifts by less and
is steeper than the function, which has
∼
e as a Þxed point, so that
∼
e moves faster to the
right than e∗1 asM increases. We next consider the region where the CSS is dominated.
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We Þrst show that this area increases. By A3 and A4 we have ∂CS∗/∂M < ∂
∼
S∗/∂M .
Since ∂CS∗/∂e < ∂
∼
S∗/∂e it follows that ∂
∼
e/∂M < ∂e0/∂M , i.e. the function that
has e0 as a Þxed point shifts more and is ßatter than the function, which has
∼
e as a
Þxed point, so that
∼
e moves less to the right than e0 as M increases. We now show the
last statement of the proposition. By A3 and A4 and since ε0(N −M) > 0, we have
∂S∗2/∂M > ∂CS
∗/∂M . Since ∂S∗2/∂e > ∂CS
∗/∂e it follows that ∂e0/∂M > ∂e∗2/∂M ,
i.e. e0 moves faster to the right than e∗2 as M increases. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 indicates that in the presence of larger mergers, both standards perform
relatively worse, to the extent that the range of parameters for which either standard
yields ineﬃcient outcomes increases.
Consider those mergers which reduce welfare but are pushed through under the wel-
fare standard. Larger mergers tend to reduce welfare for any level of the eﬃciency
parameter, so that in principle Þrms have to provide more inducement in order to push
them through (i.e.
∼
e moves right - see Figure 5). However, larger mergers also enhance
the proÞts that are available to provide inducement to the agency. Under the assump-
tions of our model6, the latter eﬀect always dominates the former so that the range of
parameters for which ineﬃcient mergers are pushed through increases.
Proposition 3 also illustrates that increasing the size of a merger does not necessarily
lead to more regulatory clearance. When increasing the size of mergers has a strong
eﬀect on the industry proÞts, more precisely when ∂S
∗
1
∂M
> 0, then e∗1 moves left (see the
proof of proposition 3), regulatory clearance will never be jeopardised by larger mergers.
However, when the eﬀect of larger mergers on industry proÞts is smaller, more precisely
∂S∗1
∂M
< 0, then e∗1 moves right but by less than
∼
e. In this case, there will be a range of
eﬃciency parameters for which regulatory clearance will be jeopardised as the merger
becomes larger.
Consider the range of eﬃciency parameters for which the consumer surplus standard
yields an ineﬃcient outcome. As mergers become larger, both welfare and consumer
surplus are reduced (so that both
∼
e and e0 shift right). Under the assumptions of our
model, the eﬀect on consumer surplus is greater than the eﬀect on welfare so the range
of parameter for which the consumer surplus standard yields an ineﬃcient outcome
increases (e0 moves further to the right than
∼
e). However, Proposition 3 also shows (see
the proof) that e0 moves further to the right than e∗2, which implies that the relative
size of the regions for which a type I error occurs under the consumer surplus standard
6It follows from the fact that welfare is less aﬀected by eﬃciency than industry proÞts and by the
fact that welfare is an average of proÞt (which increase with merger size) and consumer surplus (which
decreases with merger size).
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tends to shrink relative to the region for which there is wasteful lobbying. The reason
is as follows: when the size of the mergers increases, consumers surplus fall and more
inducement has to provided to the agency. However, industry proÞts also increase so
that more inducement is available. As before, under the assumptions of our model7,
the latter eﬀect dominates the former and the range of parameter for which successful
lobbying arises increases. As a consequence, the range of parameter for which a type
I error occurs will shrink relative to the range for which successful  but wasteful 
lobbying arises.
Having considered how the ranges of eﬃciency parameters for either standard is inef-
Þcient change with merger size, the next propositions analyses how merger size changes
the relative costs and beneÞts of the two standards.
Proposition 4 When the CSS dominates, larger mergers increase the net beneÞt of the
CSS standard, whenever ∂S
∗
1
∂M
> 0, i.e. when increasing merger size has a strong eﬀect
on industry proÞts.
Proof: Consider the region where the CSS dominates. By A3 and Lemma 2, we know
that Fm+Fc increases inM . Using Lemmata 7 and 8, it follows that ∂(W1−W2)/∂M < 0
in this region. When ∂S
∗
1
∂M
> 0 , e∗1 moves left and the net beneÞt of the CSS increases.
Q.E.D.
The intuition behind this proposition is straightforward. As discussed above, when
increasing the size of mergers has a strong eﬀect on industry proÞts, it will never jeop-
ardise regulatory clearance. In other words, the range of eﬃciency parameters for which
the mergers are pushed through with a given merger size includes the set of eﬃciency
parameters for which the mergers are pushed through with any lower merger size. In
addition, for any value of the eﬃciency parameter, a larger merger size implies that the
type II error is more costly and that a stronger inducement (hence more waste) has to
be provided to the agency to push the merger through. In those circumstances, the cost
of the welfare standard it thus unambiguously greater.
When increasing the size of mergers has a weaker eﬀect on industry proÞts, the
matter is less clear. In those circumstances e∗1 moves right, and some larger mergers
(with low eﬃciency) are blocked, which is Þrst best.
Proposition 5 When the CSS is dominated the eﬀect of larger mergers on the net cost
of the CSS is ambiguous. However, the CSS is more attractive with larger mergers
whenever the lobbying is eﬃcient, and when marginal co-ordination costs are high.
7It follows from the fact that consumer surplus is less aﬀected by eﬃciency than industry proÞts and
by the fact that welfare is an average of proÞt (which increase with merger size) and consumer surplus
(which decreases with merger size).
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Proof : Note that ∂
∼
e/∂M and ∂e0/∂M are unaﬀected by α, β, and ε0. Further note
that ∂S∗2/∂M is increasing in α, β, and ε
0 which implies that ∂2e∗2/∂M∂α, ∂
2e∗2/∂M∂β,
and ∂2e∗2/∂M∂ε
0 are negative. The result follows then from Lemma 9. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 conÞrms that the eﬀect of merger size on the cost of the consumer
surplus standard is ambiguous. This should not come as a surprise given that increasing
the merger size both increases and shifts rightward the range of parameters for which
the consumer surplus standard yields an ineﬃcient outcome.
The second part of the proposition uncovers a complementarity between merger size
and the eﬃciency of the lobbying process: the eﬀect of merger size on the range over
which the consumer surplus standard yields ineﬃcient outcomes is unaﬀected by the
eﬃciency of lobbying. But the eﬀect of merger size on the region over which a type
I error occurs within that range is negatively inßuenced by the eﬃciency of lobbying.
The more eﬃcient the lobbying, the more the region over which type I errors occurs will
shrink when merger size increases. Hence, not only does lobbying reduce the cost of the
consumer surplus standard on it own right (see above), but it also make the consumer
surplus standard more attractive when merger size increases.
Collecting the above results, we Þnd that eﬃcient lobbying and large mergers rein-
force each other in reducing the cost the consumer surplus standard in regions where it
yields an ineﬃcient outcome. Where the welfare standard yields ineﬃcient outcomes,
large mergers make matters worse independently of the eﬃciency of lobbying (at least
when larger mergers have a strong eﬀect on industry proÞts).
5 Conclusion
This paper evaluates alternative rules that can be assigned to a merger control agency
which can be inßuenced by interested parties. We Þnd that neither a welfare standard nor
a consumer surplus standard dominates. The consumer surplus and welfare standard also
give rise to diﬀerent types of ineﬃciencies: relatively ineﬃcient mergers  which decrease
welfare  are pushed through under a welfare standard, while relatively eﬃcient mergers
(which would increase welfare) are prohibited under the consumer surplus standard.
While lobbying activity is undesirable under a welfare standard, it raises welfare under
a consumer surplus standard.
The process of lobbying - as characterized by transparency and co-ordination costs -
is shown to be important in terms of the relative performance of the two standards. Both
transparency as well as co-ordination costs make lobbying less eﬀective. Under a welfare
standard this has two eﬀects. On the one hand, it will reduce the scope of undesirable
deals that Þrms can manage to push through. On the other hand, transparency and
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co-ordination costs impose a constraint that Þrms can only circumvent at a cost. By
contrast, transparency or co-ordination costs do not aﬀect the scope of deals for which
a consumer surplus standard is ineﬃcient. It only aﬀects the balance between wrong
decisions and waste in lobbying. For instance, more transparency actually shift the
balance towards wrong decisions because it reduces Þrmss eﬀectiveness in lobbying.
Since wrong decisions are socially more costly than lobbying, transparency is actually
not desirable under a consumer surplus standard.
We also Þnd that the size of the proposed merger has a diﬀerent impact on the
performance of the two standards. Under the welfare standard, there are two eﬀects.
On the one hand, larger mergers, which have more resources to lobby the agency, manage
to push more numerous deals through, despite the fact that larger deals are also less
desirable in terms of welfare (and hence require more lobbying to be pushed through).
On the other hand, the deals that are pushed through may on average be less damaging
so that the overall eﬀect is ambiguous. Still, when industry proÞts are strongly aﬀected
by the size of the merger, the former eﬀect will dominate and the welfare standard will
perform relatively worse.
The matter is diﬀerent for a consumer surplus standard. The range of deals for which
ineﬃcient outcomes arise increases with larger mergers. But larger mergers also tend to
shift the balance away from wrong decisions and in favour of wasteful lobbying (because
Þrms have more resources). As result, the performance of the consumer surplus standard
is not unambiguously worse with larger mergers. In addition, we observe that larger
mergers will shift the balance away from decisions errors more Þrmly when transparency
is low. Hence, low transparency and larger mergers are circumstances that reinforce
each other in making a consumer surplus standard more attractive.
These Þndings suggest that a reform of the standard that is assigned to a competition
agency needs to consider the institutional environment in which the agency operates and
the population of cases that the agency is likely to consider. For instance, it may not
be appropriate for the EU to move towards a welfare standard unless the transparency
of its procedure is greatly improved. The average size of proposed mergers has been
unusually large in the recent merger wave (see European Economy, 1999). If one expects
this feature to persist, our analysis would imply that maintaining a consumer surplus
standard may be appropriate.
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Figure 1
Structure of the Game
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